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NOTES
Conclusion

The joinder of facts in the Escobedo holding has wrought
serious controversy over its meaning and effect. It is submitted,
however, that the path hewn by the New York courts is at best
tangential. This position is substantiated by the general tenor of
the Escobedo opinion, and by the recent history of the Supreme
Court which evidences a marked tendency toward proscribing prior
law enforcement practices in favor of a countervailing interest
in the protection of the individual.
Certainly, the underlying problem, that is, a denial of substantial justice to one accused of crime, remains the same whether
there is a request for counsel or not. Vital individual rights cannot
be mechanically denied, and the formalistic distinctions made in
New York regarding the origin of a request are not even logically
satisfying. When the accused is unaware, and is not advised
of his rights, he is prone to the loss of defenses and privileges.
It is this occurrence which truly makes the trial no more than
an appeal from the interrogation, and this is exactly what the
Escobedo Court attempted to eliminate. In fact, Escobedo concluded that a system of law enforcement which depends for success
upon obtaining a confession will be less reliable and more subject
to abuse than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence
independently secured through skillful investigation.

ELECTRONIC

EAVESDROPPING-THE INADEQUATE PROTECTION
OF PRIVATE

COMMUNICATION

Introduction
Electronic eavesdropping devices, the "tools" I which enable
one to surreptitiously monitor and record a private conversation
not conducted within his physical presence, 2 have become a problem

' For a description of directional microphones, tape recorders, induction
coils, and various other electronic eavesdropping devices currently available
see DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, TE EAVESDROPPERS 305-81 (1959).
For a discussion of the use of miniature microphones and radio transmitters,
and the possibility of eavesdropping by laser light, see Time, March 6, 1964,

pp. 55-56.
2
Electronic eavesdropping may be classified into three general categories:
(1) wiretapping, which may be accomplished by means of a physical
connection to the tapped line, or by means of an induction coil,
in which case no direct connection is necessary;
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of grave concern. "Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government . . . to obtain disclosure in court of
what is whispered in the closet," and legal protection of private
communication has been rendered ineffective by certain technological
advances in electronics. It is generally agreed that some form
of regulation and control of electronic eavesdropping devices is
necessary. 4 However, there is no universal agreement as to the
type or degree of control to be employed, 5 since such regulation
necessarily involves the problem of balancing "the right of the
individual against the need of society to protect itself from serious
criminal activity.""
It is the purpose of this note to examine the law of eavesdropping, to point out the pertinent legal and social problems,
and to suggest possible solutions.
History 7

The Federal Level
In Ohnstead v. Uzited States,' decided in 1928, the Supreme
Court held that the privacy of telephone conversations was not
constitutionally protected. The Court reasoned that the interception
of such communications by means of a wiretap was not a trespass,
and consequently, did not constitute an unreasonable search and
(2) "bugging," which involves the placing of a microphone, tape recorder, or miniature radio transmitter in the area wherein the conversation is to take place; and
(3) "long distance" eavesdropping, which includes all forms of eavesdropping by devices not included in the above-named categories, and
which usually is accomplished by means of parabolic or directional
microphones which can pick up conversations at distances of 100
feet or more.
States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (dissenting
3 Olmstead v. United
opinion).
&See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Committee Report] ; REPORT OF THE JOINT LEIsLATIVE
COMMITIrEE TO STUDY ILLEGAL INTERCEPTION OF CodmuNIcATIoxs, N.Y.
Leg. Doec. No. 53 (1956).
5 See Spnnposium-The Wiretapting-Eavesdropping Problem: Reflections
Ons The Eavesdroppers, 44 MINN. L. REv. 813 (1960).
6 Committee Report 449.
7 At common law, eavesdroppers, those who "listen under walls or
windows or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse," were indicted
under the theory of common nuisance. 4 BLAca sToNE, COMMENTARIES *
168. Electrical eavesdropping, in the form of interception of telegraphic
messages, was employed during the Civil War, and New York police were
using wiretapping in criminal investigations as early as 1892. DASH,
ScnwAR'z & Kaxowvrox, op. cit. supra note 1, at 23, 35.

8277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 9 This rule,
which requires that a trespass is essential to the establishment
of an unconstitutional infringement upon the rights of the individual, has endured to the present time.
In reaction to Olmstead, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act 10 (hereinafter referred to as the Federal Act),
which prohibits the interception and divulgence of radio and wire
communications.
The Supreme Court has held that evidence
obtained in violation of the Federal Act is inadmissible in a federal
court.1 However, such evidence is admissible in a state court 12
even though divulgence of the information secured through the use
of a wiretap constitutes a federal crime. 13
Since the Federal Act proscribes only interception and divulgence
of wire and radio transmissions, other, more sophisticated forms
of electronic eavesdropping, are not prohibited. Thus, in Goldman
v. United States,14 where federal agents had placed a detectaphone
against a common wall in order to eavesdrop, the evidence so obtained was admissible since "what was heard . . was not made
illegal by trespass or unlawful entry." 15
Similarly, in Lopez v. United States,16 where a wire recorder
was concealed on the person of an Internal Revenue agent, evidence
of attempted bribery, thereby recorded, was admissible. The Court
rejected the argument that the conduct of17 the federal agent
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure.
In Silverman v. United States,5 however, where federal police
officers had driven a "spike mike" into a party-wall in order to
eavesdrop, the Court held this conduct to be an illegal invasion
of a constitutionally protected area, and ruled that evidence
9The fourth amendment provides that: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirnation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.

10 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964). The pertinent parts of
this section are as follows: "no person receiving . . . or transmitting . . .
any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or
publish the . . contents . . . thereof ... and no person not being authorized
by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge . . . the
contents . . . of such intercepted communication. . .
1"Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (evidence obtained by
federal agents); Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957) (evidence
obtained by state agents).
12 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
'3 See id. at 202; RrcHAusoN, EviDEwcE § 147 (Prince ed. 1964).
'4316 U.S. 129 (1942).
15 Id. at 134. (Emphasis added.)
16 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
17 Id. at 438-39.
is 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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so obtained was inadmissible. The Court's decision was based on
the physical intrusion into Silverman's premises in violation of the
search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment.
Thus, where there is no illegal invasion of a constitutionally
protected area, evidence obtained through the use of electronic
eavesdropping devices is admissible in federal courts. However,
where the electronic eavesdropping is accomplished by means of an
illegal trespass, the evidence so obtained is inadmissible in a
federal court as having been obtained through an illegal search
and seizure.
The State Level
State regulation of eavesdropping is by no means uniform,
and it varies in degree from absolute prohibition to complete
freedom from control; the New York position is located between
the two extremes.19
While some states have enacted no statutory scheme to
control eavesdropping, 20 Illinois has prohibited all forms of eavesdropping by device,2 ' and evidence obtained in violation of the
statute is inadmissible in a civil or criminal trial.2 2 However,
consent by one of the parties to the monitored conversation will
defeat the purpose of the statute, since a violation occurs only
where the consent of neither party has been obtained. 23 Thus,
a conversation may be monitored where one party has consented,
even though the other party is unaware that it is being overheard
by a third person.
In New York, electronic eavesdropping may be performed by
state officers, 24 subject to certain exceptions, 25 and only after
obtaining a court order.20 Even though the New York procedure
apparently authorizes a violation of the Federal Act, the New
19 See generally Cmnmittee Report.
20 Committee Report 550-51, 554.

21 Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1 (b), 14-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
22 1LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-5 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
23 See Magee v. Williams, 329 F.2d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Pullings, 321 F2d 287, 295 (7th Cir. 1963).
24 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a, b.
25 New York police officers may use electronic eavesdropping devices without court order when they have reasonable grounds to believe that evidence
of a crime may thereby be obtained and time does not permit application
for an order. The application must be made within twenty-four hours
after the commencement of the eavesdropping. However, in all instances,
wiretapping must be authorized by court order. Supra note 24.
26 N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12 (1954); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 739; N.Y. CoDa
CaRm. PROC.

§ 813-a.
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has upheld the statute, and has admitted
York Court of Appeals
2 7
evidence so obtained.

The Current Conflict
In Nardone v. United States,28 the Supreme Court, in construing the Federal Act, held evidence obtained by federal officers
in violation of that statute inadmissible in a federal court. The
Court did not consider the constitutionality of the admission
of evidence obtained by use of a wiretap, but decided the case
solely on the grounds of the statutory prohibition.
The Nardone rule is to be distinguished from the exclusionary
rule established in Weeks v. United States2 0 In Weeks, the Court
had held that evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of the
fourth amendment was inadmissible in a federal court. This exclusionary rule was inapplicable in Nardone since, by the rule of
Olntead, wiretapping is not violative of the fourth amendment.
It is apparent, therefore, that there are, in reality, two federal
exclusionary rules applicable to evidence obtained by means of
electronic eavesdropping. Under the Nardone rule, wiretap evidence is inadmissible in a federal court; under the Weeks rule,
evidence obtained by those forms of electronic eavesdropping which
involve an unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible in a
federal court.
The Nardone rule has not been applied to the states, and
therefore, the admissibility of evidence obtained by means of a
wiretap is determined by state rules of evidence. Thus, such
evidence obtained by wiretap is admissible in New York courts,
even though divulgence constitutes a federal crime. Illinois, however, will admit wiretap evidence only where the consent of a
party to the conversation has been obtained.
While each state is free to determine whether or not wiretap evidence will be admissible in its courts, discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence obtained by other forms
of electronic eavesdropping has been limited by the Supreme Court.
In the celebrated case of Mapp v. Ohio, 0 the exclusionary rule
of Weeks was made binding upon the states. Under the Mapp
decision, all evidence obtained by use of electronic eavesdropping
27 People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S,2d 406,
remilttitur amended, 11 N.Y.2d 1057, 184 N.E.2d 184, 230 N.Y.S.2d 212,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962). However, where the statutory provisions
for eavesdropping by court order are not complied with, evidence obtained
in violation of the statute is inadmissible in a New York court. CPLR
4506.
28 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
29232 U.S. 383 (1914).

30 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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devices which involve an unreasonable search and seizure must
be excluded from both state and federal courts. The states are
no longer allowed to admit evidence which has been obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment, and any rule of evidence to
the contrary is now unconstitutional.
In People v. Grossman,31 police officers, after obtaining an
eavesdropping order, planted a "bug" in the defendant's house,
and thus, the New York supreme court was directly presented
with the question of the constitutionality of the state's procedure
for eavesdropping sanctioned by court order. In holding the
evidence so obtained inadmissible, the court stated that "insofar
as any statute or court order attempts to authorize such physical
invasion or intrusion, it would be unconstitutional." 32 The court
based its decision on the finding of a physical intrusion in violation
of the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment,
and in reference to the totality of the New York procedure for
eavesdropping by court order, stated:
a search warrant under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment
must be in advance of the search and specify with particularity the
things to be seized. Obviously, a State eavesdropping order cannot
specify with particularity in advance the conversations or verbal statements to be seized.33
Thus, while New York presently permits electronic eavesdropping, the well-reasoned opinion in Grossman has cast grave doubt
upon the constitutional validity of this practice.
Possible Solutions
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The Supreme Court could, by defining all forms of electronic
eavesdropping as unreasonable searches and seizures, impose the
exclusionary rule of Weeks upon the states through the authority
of Mapp. It has been suggested that "the distinction made between the Goldman and Silverman cases [i.e., the prerequisite
trespass to establish unconstitutionality] seems too unsubstantial
to long remain part of the law." 34 Mr. Justice Douglas has stated
that wiretapping is violative of the fourth amendment, 5 and has
expressed his belief that prior decisions of the Court to the contrary are erroneous.8 8
3145 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1965).

Id. at 574, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
Id. at 567, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
34 RICrARDsox, Evmzxca § 148 (Prince ed. 1964).
35
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1951)
opinion).
3
32
33

6Supra note 12, at 205 (dissenting opinion).

(dissenting
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In reference to non-wiretap eavesdropping, Mr. Justice Douglas
has maintained that "the depth of the penetration of the electronic
device-even the degree of its remoteness from the inside of the
house-is not the measure of the injury." 37 It is his position
that the command of the fourth amendment should not be "limited
by nice distinctions
turning on the kind of electronic equipment
''
employed. 3
The Right of Privacy
The emerging and not yet clearly defined right of privacy might
well provide a basis for protection of private communications, since
the Supreme Court has several times alluded to the existence of
such a constitutional right.3 9 In Griswold v. Connecticut,4 0 basing
its position on the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the Court flatly
declared that such a right does indeed exist within the boundaries of marriage. It was stated that the idea of allowing police
officers to search the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" for
evidence of the use of contraceptives is "repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marital relationship." 41
Present laws, however, do not prevent the police from electronically eavesdropping on conversations held in that same bedroom
for evidence of crimes. The right to be secure from physical
intrusions of the home means very little if the same information
can be purloined by the use of "long distance" eavesdropping
devices.
Mr. Justice Clark has not restricted the right of privacy
to the realm of the marital relationship. In Mapp v. Ohio he
stated:
having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be
3 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961)
(concurring
opinion). (Emphasis added.) It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice
Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion, has not always recognized a constitutionally protected right of privacy. He had agreed with the majority
in Goldman in holding that there was no constitutional objection to surreptitious recording of a private conversation. However, in On Lee v.
United States, a case almost indistinguishable from Goldman on its facts,
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, stated that the right of privacy is guaranteed
by the fourth amendment. After discussing various types of electronic eavesdropping devices then in use, he stated: "I now more fully appreciate the
vice of the practices spawned by Olmstead and Goldman." Supra note
35.
38 Ibid.
39 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, .supra note 30; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
40 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
41 Id. at 486.
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secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore,
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain
an empty promise.It is conceivable, therefore, that a basis for protection of private
communications may be founded in an extension of the right of
privacy as it is now recognized and protected by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion
Constitutional guarantees should not be limited in scope to
prohibit only those invasions which were possible at the time of
the enactment of the Bill of Rights. It is not the device which

must be examined, but rather the nature of the right which is
sought to be protected. The right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures and the right to enjoy the privacy of one's
home should not be made to depend upon the state of technology
at any given time. Recognition of the essential nature of the rights
and their protection against encroachment by the federal and state
governments, will insure that technology will not reduce such
rights to mere "empty promises."
While recognition of the unconstitutionality of electronic
eavesdropping by police officers would render evidence so obtained
inadmissible in both state and federal courts, such recognition would
not, ipso facto, bring an end to the practice. Although the Constitution affords protection to the individual against acts of the
government, it does not protect against the acts of private citizens.
In the absence of legislation, private individuals would still be
free to use electronic and other devices for the purpose of eavesdropping.
It would appear, therefore, that the true solution to the problem
lies not only in holding eavesdropping to be an unreasonable search
and seizure and a contravention of the right of privacy, but also
in enacting comprehensive legislation on the federal level. Such
legislation, proscribing all forms of eavesdropping by device, except
with consent of all parties to the conversation, and providing severe
penalties for violation, would discourage the practice of electronic
eavesdropping, and provide a measure of protection for private
communications not found under present law.

42

Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 30, at 660.

